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“Who Then in Law is My Neighbour?” – Reverting to First 
Principles in the High Court of Australia 
 
 
Abstract  
 
A trilogy of recent cases before the Full Bench of the High Court of Australia indicate 
a return to the celebrated statements of Lord Atkin, (himself a native of Australia) 
formulated some seventy years earlier, as the underlying guide in determining 
whether a duty of care exists in any circumstance.  
 
Whilst various approaches have emerged in the High Court over the past decade 
involving differing combinations of principle, policy and incremental development, 
none has proved satisfactory as a general determinant of duty of care in the expanding 
focus of negligence litigation.  
 
This article suggests that the search for a general determinant of the duty issue, has 
finished where it began and that the principle of neighbourhood as formulated and 
intended by Lord Atkin has and will continue to provide a universal yardstick as to 
the existence of a prima facie duty of care. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Various reasons underpin the approaches that have emerged in Australia and other 
common law countries for determining a duty of care.  Not least has been the 
recognition of exceptions or the general abandonment of the exclusionary rule (a rule 
denying generally any recovery for purely economic loss not resultant on injury to the 
plaintiff’s person or property). 
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Claims for purely economic loss resulting from negligent acts or statements (advice or 
information) raise the spectre of indeterminate liability and have provided 
adventurous lawyers and disgruntled clients with a new horizon of potential awards. 
Claims for negligently inflicted purely economic loss may involve mass torts such as 
economic loss from the failure of public utilities (eg power supply).1  Environmental 
or toxic torts (eg asbestos, agent orange, oil spills)2 and class actions by consumers for 
defective or dangerous products (eg silicon implants, cigarettes) have absorbed for 
years the entire focus of some law firms.  
 
Actions for wrongful birth3 and claims against public authorities4 highlight some of 
the expanding areas of negligence law.  
 
Speculative actions (no win no fee) and a heightened awareness in the community 
through media coverage of negligence litigation and large awards have contributed to 
the volume of such litigation.  
 
Negligently inflicted economic loss and negligently caused psychiatric illness are 
similar, in that they have the propensity to manifest at one or more removes from the 
direct effect of the negligence (the ripple effect).5  Such claims have challenged the 
Courts to find an approach to duty of care which balances the need for corrective and 
compensatory justice to victims of negligence, while preventing an indeterminate 
                                                 
1 SCM (United Kingdom) Ltd v W J Whittal and Son Ltd [1971] 1 QB 337; Spartan Steel and Alloys 
Ltd v Martin and Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] 1 QB 27.  
2 See e.g. Union Oil Company v Oppen (1974) 501 F 2d 558.  
3 See e.g. Goodwill v Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996] 2 All E R 161. 
4 See most recently Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan: Ryan v Great Lakes Council:  New South 
Wales v Ryan (2002) 77 ALJR 183 
5  Annetts v Australian Station Pty Ltd (2002) 76 ALJR 1348 
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liability where potential awards far outweigh the wrong done.  Justice to the plaintiff 
may be weighed against wider public interest and policy concerns such as the 
undermining of existing patterns of law in other fields; statutory intent denying such 
liability; interference with the defendant’s legitimate pursuit of personal advantage; 
economic efficiency and the ready availability of cheap loss insurance rather than 
prohibitive liability insurance; availability of other remedies, for instance in contract. 
More specific policy issues which may conflict with the right of the innocent plaintiff 
to be compensated for negligently generated economic loss can include: the public 
interest in protecting policy discretions (as opposed to operational decisions) 
exercised by public authorities; whether tort law should compensate for interference 
with a mere expectation; immunity of barristers from suit for “in Court” negligence; 
joint illegal enterprise as a bar to civil suit. It is the search for an approach that can 
accommodate and balance these issues in the variety of negligence claims that has 
caused differing formulations for the ascertainment of a duty of care in a given 
circumstance.  
 
 
The Approaches 
 
The approaches that have emerged over the past decade in the High Court of Australia 
are variant combinations of incremental development, principle and policy.  When 
synthesized, three fundamental approaches to determining duty have been utilized in 
the High Court.6 
Firstly, an incremental or categories approach recognizing a duty of care in discrete 
categories.  This approach relies on deduction and analogy with precedents in 
established categories of duty.  
                                                 
6 See Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180 at269,270 
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Secondly, an approach reliant on an examination of “salient features” or “legal 
policy” factors that support or derogate from a finding of duty.  Some of these “salient 
factors” are universal while others are relevant in discrete categories.  A non-
exhaustive list might include: indeterminate liability; unwarranted interference with 
the autonomy of individuals; vulnerability of the plaintiff involving control of the 
defendant and dependence by the plaintiff (the plaintiff having no alternative legal 
means of protection e.g. by contract); knowledge actual or constructive of the 
defendant that its act will harm the plaintiff; undermining existing patterns of law in 
other fields; statutory intent denying such liability; economic efficiency. 
Thirdly, an approach or methodology of general application involving an examination 
of the criteria of “reasonable foreseeability”, “proximity” and competing “policy” to 
provide an answer to the duty question. 7 
 
Inadequacies of these Approaches 
 
It is suggested that the inability of the varied approaches utilized by the High Court to 
provide a workable yardstick to the range and diversity of negligence claims has led 
the Court back to first principles.  
 
 
Incremental or categories approach 
 
 
If as Sir Gordon Bisson commented in the Court of Appeal in New Zealand on the 
incremental or categories approach , it described a process involving “an incremental 
step being a small amount by which a variable quantity increases”8, then in many of 
the novel claims brought before the courts it has not been possible to work 
                                                 
7  Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180 ; Romeo v Conservation Commission of the Northern 
Territory (1998) 192 CLR 431; Pyrennes Shire Council v Day  (1998) 192 CLR 330 
8 South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants and Investigations Ltd 
[1992] 2 NZLR 282 at 325. 
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incrementally from established categories or cases. The “cell must divide” providing 
for a new category or the court must refuse to expand the existing categories.  This 
difficulty with incremental development can be highlighted in the tort of negligent 
misstatement. The foundation cases established a duty of care was owed to an 
identified and intended recipient of negligent advice where the speaker had directed 
the statement for use by the recipient in a known transaction.9  It was not an 
incremental step to expand liability from this established category of the intended user 
of a negligent statement, to encompass an unintended and unknown user or a passive 
sufferer of a third party’s reliance on negligent advice.  If a duty of care arose in these 
latter categories, it required a “giant leap” not an incremental step.  No guidance was 
given to the court by an incremental or categories approach to the duty issue. As 
stated earlier, either the cell had to divide or the law had to confine liability to the 
existing “intended user” category.  Examples can be provided ad nauseum to indicate 
the inadequacy of an incremental or categories approach in providing a yardstick on 
the duty issue in novel claims for negligence. Whether to expand liability for 
negligently inflicted psychiatric illness from the established category requiring direct 
perception of a distressing event or its immediate aftermath, to such illness caused by 
mere communication of distressing news, is not a question resolved by analogy 
between the existing category and the proposed new category.  Such a choice is made 
by reference to over-arching principle or relevant policy issues.  
 
Criticism of the approach has come from members of the High Court itself. Gummow 
J has stated that “the making of a new precedent will not be determined merely by 
seeking the comfort of a earlier decision of which the case at bar may be seen as an 
                                                 
9 Candler v Crane Christmas and Co [1951] 2 KB 164; Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd 
[1964] AC 465. 
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incremental development, with an analogy to an established category.  Such a 
proposition, in terms used by McCarthy J in the Irish Supreme Court, ‘suffers from a 
temporal defect  – that rights should be determined by the accident of birth’”.10  Kirby 
J has stated that the exceptional categories “wander on the face of the law in search of 
an unexpressed general principle”11 
 
The “Salient Features” Approach 
 
 
A fundamental criticism of this approach is that it has not provided a methodology but 
is simply a list of potentially relevant “legal policy” factors whose prioritizing and 
significance in any given circumstance depends on a value judgment.  These “salient 
features” have been listed above.  No over-arching principles guide the application 
and importance of these salient features.  The weighing of such factors involves an ad 
hoc response and such an approach provides no guidance or predictability as to the 
likely outcome of the duty issue in novel cases.  Conceptually, these salient features 
belong to the evaluation of considerations of policy and are not anchored to legal 
principle.  They derive from public policy and justice concerns.  
 
Kirby J in the High Court of Australia has been the most vocal critic of the “salient 
features” approach stating that these so called “principles” were not issues relevant to 
all negligence actions and it was therefore inappropriate to elevate them so that they 
were legal preconditions to the existence of a duty of care in negligence.  They were 
not even essential or relevant to every case framed in negligence.12  Kirby J has 
rejected the “salient features” approach referring to the necessity for a general or 
                                                 
10 (1999) 198 CLR 180 at 253,254 
11 Ibid at 280,281 
12 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180 at 285 
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conceptual methodology, which provides the headings to which such considerations 
can be assigned.13  
 
While an examination of these legal policy factors may produce a just outcome on the 
duty issue by weighing public interest factors against individual rights, it is at the 
expense of certainty and predictability.  Kirby J has stated that “a cornucopia of 
verbal riches has been deployed to identify what, in given proceedings, these ‘salient 
features’ will be”.14 
 
It might be suggested that an examination of salient features is not an approach at all 
but merely an unfettered discretion to prioritise factors, which subjectively appeal to 
the court as relevant in the case at hand. For instance where a finding of duty of care 
might potentially lead to indeterminate liability, how is such a factor to be weighed 
against the right of a foreseeable victim to compensation for gross negligence, 
particularly where the victim was vulnerable and under the control of the defendant 
and had no access to other means of compensation? Some support for the “salient 
features” approach has come from Gaudron and McHugh JJ in the High Court.15  
 
 
The “Over-Arching Principles” Approach 
 
 
This approach in the High Court had involved the concepts of reasonable 
foreseeability, and proximity, the latter encompassing policy issues unrelated to any 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Graham Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan; Ryan v Great Lakes Council; New South Wales v Ryan (2002) 77 
ALJR 183 at 228  
15 See  the judgments of Gaudron J and McHugh J in  Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180 at 
195,203 
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measure of closeness or directness of relationship.16  It was inevitable that the High 
Court would ultimately reject the concept of proximity as providing a universal 
yardstick in the determination of duty and enlist other approaches abandoning any 
reference to proximity whatsoever. This inevitability stemmed from the meaning 
ascribed to the term and its application in negligence litigation, particularly in claims 
for purely economic loss.  The High Court had effectively divorced the term 
(proximity) from its historical narrow meaning and had pressed it into serving a 
purpose it was neither capable of nor originally designed to perform. Proximity had 
been cast adrift from its historical meaning of “neighbourhood” (closeness and 
directness of relationship measured by physical, causal or circumstantial propinquity; 
see the discussion below) and was utilized merely as a convenient label to attach to a 
complex of factors, not necessarily restricted to indicators of a close and direct 
relationship which in combination the law recognized as giving rise to a duty of 
care.17  Under this broader utilization of the concept, proximity, when held to exist, 
“announced a result rather than articulated a concept”.18  It has been suggested that 
this enlarged meaning of proximity corresponded to the duty of care question itself19 
and was a hollow concept providing no guidance beyond merely indicating that 
something more was required other than reasonable foreseeability to raise a duty of 
care.  The use of proximity in the High Court was best summarized by the majority in 
Hill v Van Erp.20 They perceived proximity as expressing the result of a process of 
reasoning rather than the process itself.  They considered however that it was a useful 
term operating as a conceptual umbrella signifying that something more than 
                                                 
16 See the discussion in Katter NA “Duty of Care in Australia; Is the Fog Lifting” (1998) 72 ALJ 871 at 
873. 
17 See Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159 
18 Sir Robin Cooke “An Impossible Distinction” (1991) 107 LQR 46 at 54.  
19 McHugh “Neighbourhood, Proximity and Reliance” in Finn (Ed) Essays on Torts (Law Book 
Company Ltd, Sydney, 1989), p 38. 
20 (1997) 188 CLR 159 
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reasonable foreseeability was required to establish a duty of care and that it was 
appropriate to describe in terms of proximity those relationships, where after the 
ordinary processes of analogy with established categories and after weighing relevant 
policy considerations, a duty had been found.21 
 
The difficulty in application and the lack of guidance provided by the above 
approaches has prompted a return by the High Court to Lord Atkin’s principle of 
“neighbourhood” as a prima facie determinant of duty.  
 
 
Lord Atkin’s Formulation of “Neighbourhood” 
 
An analysis of Lord Atkin’s celebrated judgment in Donoghue v Stevenson22 and his 
references therein to the earlier cases of Heaven v Pender23 and Le Lievre v Gould24 
indicate that Lord Atkin perceived that reasonable foreseeability as a test for duty of 
care, “was demonstrably too wide”25 to use his words.  He considered that “if properly 
limited was capable of affording a valuable practical guide”.26  Lord Atkin formulated 
the following statement as to who qualifies as a “neighbour” at law; 
 
“Persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought 
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am 
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question”27 
 
Immediately following this statement of “neighbour” Lord Atkin continued; 
 
                                                 
21 Ibid at 177,178,189. 
22 [1932] AC 562. 
23 (1883) 11 QBD 503. 
24 [1893] 1 QB 491. 
25 [1932] AC 562 at 580. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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“This appears to me to be the doctrine of Heaven v Pender as laid down by 
Lord Esher (then Brett MR) when it is limited by the notion of proximity 
introduced by Lord Esher himself and A L Smith LJ in Le Livere v Gould”28 
 
Lord Atkin’s test of “neighbourhood” or “proximity” was an overriding control on 
reasonable foreseeability at large.  His judgment in Donoghue v Stevenson indicates 
that a defendant is not liable to all those whose damage can reasonably be foreseen as 
a result of the defendant’s negligence but only to those “neighbours” who are in such 
close and direct relations to the defendant or who are so closely and directly affected 
by the defendants acts, that the defendant ought reasonably to have them in 
contemplation.  As to whether the plaintiff was in such close and direct relations with 
the defendant or was so closely and directly affected by the defendant’s act that the 
plaintiff should have been in contemplation, was not a question answered by reference 
solely to physical or geographical propinquity.  Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson 
was at pains to emphasise that proximity or neighbourhood should not be so confined 
in meaning.  He stated:  
 
“I think that this sufficiently states the truth if proximity be not confined to 
mere physical proximity, but be used, as I think it was intended, to extend to 
such close and direct relations that the act complained of directly affects a 
person whom the person alleged to be bound to take care would know would 
be directly affected by his careless act.”29 
 
This statement was made in the context of a manufacturer putting a contaminated 
product into circulation, likely to cause injury to a consumer since there was no 
possibility of intermediate examination.  There was no physical proximity between 
the manufacturer and the consumer in Donoghue v Stevenson yet, Lord Atkin was 
stating that proximity had not merely a physical dimension but included “such close 
                                                 
28 Ibid at 580,581. 
29 Ibid at 581. 
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and direct relations  that the act complained of directly affects a person whom the 
person alleged to be bound to take care would know would be directly affected by his 
careless act.”30(emphasis added). Lord Atkin here was stating that “neighbourhood” 
or “proximity” included causal and circumstantial closeness and directness of 
relations and was not confined to mere physical nearness.  
 
It is this basic test of “neighbourhood” or “proximity” (the historic and narrow 
meaning of proximity) which has been enlisted in recent judgments in the High Court 
of Australia as the foundation for determining whether a prima facie duty exists. 
 
The High Court’s Return to First Principle 
 
Three recent cases heard before a Full Bench of the High Court of Australia suggest 
the Court is returning to a fundamental application of Lord Atkin’s “neighbourhood” 
principle to answer the duty question. 
 In  Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Limited31; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v 
Ryan; Ryan v Great Lakes Council;New South Wales v Ryan32and Gifford v Strang 
Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd33 there has been consistent use by all Justices of Lord 
Atkin’s formulation. 
 
The Facts of Annetts 
 
The facts as summarized by Gleeson CJ34 were that Mr and Mrs Annetts son, aged 16, 
had gone to work for the respondent as a jackeroo in August 1986.  Seven weeks later, 
                                                 
30 Ibid  
31 (2002) 76 ALJR 1348 
32 (2002) 77 ALJR 183 
33 (2003) 77 ALJR 1205 
34 (2002) 76 ALJR 1348 at 1355 
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allegedly, contrary to the assurances that had earlier been given to the parents, he was 
sent to work alone as a caretaker on a remote property.  In December 1986, he went 
missing in circumstances where it was clear that he was in grave danger.  When Mr 
Annetts was informed of this by the police, over the telephone, he collapsed.  There 
was a prolonged search for the boy, in which Mr and Mrs Annetts took some part. His 
bloodstained hat was found in January 1987. In April 1987 the body of the boy was 
found in the desert. He had died of dehydration, exhaustion and hypothermia. Mr and 
Mrs Annetts were informed by telephone. Subsequently Mr Annetts was shown a 
photograph of the skeleton which he identified as that of his son. Mr and Mrs Annetts 
who themselves had responsibilities for the care of their son, only agreed to permit 
him to go to work for the employer after having made enquiries of the employer as to 
the arrangements that would be made for his safety and, in particular, after being 
assured that he would be under constant supervision. Contrary to those assurances, he 
was sent to work, alone, in a remote location.  The aetiology of the psychiatric illness 
suffered by Mr and Mrs Annetts (plaintiffs) was unclear. 
  
The Duty of Care Issue in Annetts 
 
The Chief Justice in Annetts reaffirmed the place of Lord Atkin’s over-arching 
principle: 
 
“Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson, spoke of the effect of acts or omissions 
on ‘persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought 
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am 
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question’. It is 
the reasonableness of a requirement that a defendant should have certain 
persons and certain interests, in contemplation, that determines the existence 
of a duty of care”35  
                                                 
35 Ibid at 1351 
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The Chief Justice then specifically applied Lord Atkin’s formulation to the facts at 
hand: 
“The applicants, on the assumed facts, who themselves had responsibilities for 
the care of their son, only agreed to permit him to go to work for the 
respondent after having made inquiries of the respondent as to the 
arrangements that would be made for his safety and, in particular, after being 
assured that he would be under constant supervision. Contrary to those 
assurances, he was sent to work, alone, in a remote location. In those 
circumstances there was a relationship between the applicants and the 
respondent of such a nature that it was reasonable to require the respondent to 
have in contemplation the kind of injury to the applicants that they suffered.”36 
            
Gaudron J likewise applied the “neighbour” principle :  
 
“…..a person will be able to recover for psychiatric injury only if there is some 
special feature of the relationship between that person and the person whose 
acts or omissions are in question such that it can be said that the latter should 
have the former in contemplation as a person closely and directly affected by 
his or her acts”37 
 
She then applied the “neighbour” question to the facts: 
 
“On the assumed facts of the second case it is possible to identify special 
features of the relationship between Mr and Mrs Annetts and Australian 
Stations such that the latter should have had them in contemplation as persons 
closely and directly affected by its acts and omissions in relation to their 
son.”38 
 
McHugh J after an analysis of Lord Atkin’s judgment in Donohue v Stevenson 
concluded that: 
 
“Neighbour = person closely and directly affected = proximity… It is true that 
reasonable foreseeability is not at large. You come under a duty only in 
                                                 
36 Ibid at 1356 
37 Ibid at 1357,1358 
38 Ibid at 1358 
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respect of acts and omissions that you can reasonably foresee may affect your 
neighbours – persons who are directly and closely affected by your acts.”39 
 
McHugh J considered that a duty of care arose in the special pre-existing relationship 
between the employer (defendant)and the plaintiffs (Mr and Mrs Annetts): 
“In the present case, the assurance of the employer gave rise to a duty on its 
part to supervise and take care of James so as to avoid inflicting harm on Mr 
and Mrs Annetts. The consideration for their consent to his going to Flora 
Valley and working for the employer was the assurance that the employer 
would supervise and take good care of him. They could have sued in contract, 
but they elected to sue in negligence under the general law. The result is the 
same. The assurance of the employer gave rise to a duty, the breach of which 
entitled Mr and Mrs Annetts to sue for any damage suffered that was 
reasonably foreseeable in a general way.”40 
 
Callinan J specifically relied on the relationship of proximity (meaning the  
close and direct relationship established between the employer of the deceased 
 boy and parents of the deceased boy) as the foundation for a duty of care in  
Annetts: 
“At the outset it is important to point out that it was the applicants' case that 
the breach of duty relied on was a breach of the duty of care owed to the 
applicants by the respondent as an employer of the applicants' child. The way 
in which the applicants alleged a relationship of proximity is important.  
‘The Plaintiffs and the Defendant were at all material times in a 
relationship of proximity arising from the following facts and 
matters:  
(a) the Defendant knew the Plaintiffs were the parents of the 
Deceased;  
(b) the Plaintiffs had made inquiries of the servants or agents of 
the Defendant in relation to the arrangements for the safety of 
the Deceased and received assurances in relation to his safety;  
(c) the Defendant knew that if there was a breach of the duty of 
care owed to the Deceased, that he may die in circumstances of 
                                                 
39 Ibid at 1366,1367 
40 Ibid at 1373 
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particular distress to his parents having regard to his manner of 
death namely perishing in the desert;  
(d) the Defendant knew of the ongoing concern of the Plaintiffs 
in relation to the supervision of the Deceased and were on 
notice by reason of their earlier and ongoing inquiries that if 
there was a breach of the duty of care owed by the Defendant 
as the employer of the Deceased to the Deceased that there was 
a foreseeable risk that the parents would suffer not only a grief 
reaction but in addition a reaction extending beyond grief to an 
entrenched psychiatric condition of the type which has since 
developed;  
(e) the Plaintiffs also allege that as parents of the Deceased they 
were within the range of persons who an employer owed a duty 
of care to and that breach of the employer's duty of care 
resulting in death to a young employee such as the Deceased, 
would be likely to cause psychiatric injury to near relatives;  
(f) the Plaintiffs relied upon the Defendant to supervise the 
Deceased as a 16 year old child and entrusted [it] with his care 
and welfare, a matter about which the Defendant knew or ought 
to have known."  
I endorse the applicants' submission that by reason of the relationship of 
proximity identified in the paragraphs above, the respondent owed a duty of 
care to the applicants as the parents of the deceased.”41 
The close and direct relationship between the employer and the 
 parents of the deceased boy underpinned the finding of duty in the joint 
 judgment of Gummow and Kirby JJ: 
“ The connections between the parties indicate the existence of a duty 
of care. An antecedent relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, especially where the latter has assumed some responsibility 
to the former to avoid exposing him or her to a risk of psychiatric 
harm, may supply the basis for importing a duty of care…. In the 
present case, the applicants sought and obtained from the respondent 
assurances that James would be appropriately supervised. The 
respondent undertook specifically to act to minimise the risk of harm 
to James and, by inference, to minimise the risk of psychiatric injury to 
the applicants. In those circumstances, the recognition of a duty of care 
does not raise the prospect of an intolerably large or indeterminate 
class of potential plaintiffs.”42 
                                                 
41 Ibid at 1413 
42 Ibid at 1390, 1391 
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Similarly, Hayne J focused on the closeness of relationship between the  
parents of the deceased boy and the defendant as the basis for duty of care: 
           “The relationship which existed, between the parents of a child and the 
defendant for whom and at whose premises the child was to work and 
to live, may readily be seen to be a relationship in which the defendant 
may owe the parent a duty to take reasonable care not to cause 
psychiatric harm to parents of reasonable or ordinary fortitude by 
reason of the negligent causing of injury or death to the child.”43  
 
The Facts of Barclay Oysters 
 
The essential facts underlying the litigation are summarized concisely by Gleeson CJ: 
 
 “In December 1996, Mr Ryan consumed oysters that a relative had purchased 
from the companies described in the joint judgment as the Barclay companies.  The 
oysters which had been grown in Wallis Lake, near Forster (New South Wales) were 
contaminated. In consequence, Mr Ryan contracted the Hepatitis A virus (“HAV”).  
Heavy rainfall over a period in November 1996 had increased the risk of pollution of 
the Lake from a number of sources, and had resulted in cessation of harvesting for 
four days.  In February 1997, a HAV epidemic was notified, and on 14 February 1997 
Wallis Lake growers ceased harvesting for the season. In seeking to assign legal 
responsibility for the harm he suffered, Mr Ryan blamed the growers and distributors 
of the oysters (the Barclay Companies), the Great Lakes Council, which was the local 
government authority that exercised regulatory functions, including functions 
designed to protect the environment, under the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), 
and the State of NSW.”44 
 
                                                 
43 Ibid at 1403 
44 (2002) 77 ALJR 183 at 186 
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The issues in the appeal before the High Court were whether the State of NSW or the 
Great Lakes Council owed a duty of care to Mr Ryan and whether the Barclay 
companies breached the duty of care that they admittedly owed to Mr Ryan.45 
 
The Duty of Care Issue in Barclay Oysters 
 
Kirby J in reference to the resolution of the duty of care question in Australia 
commented that “it would be desirable for the court to identify a universal 
methodology or approach, to guide the countless judges, legal practitioners, litigants, 
insurance companies and ordinary citizens in resolving contested issues about the 
existence or absence of a duty of care, the breach of which will give rise to a cause of 
action enforceable under the common law tort of negligence.”46  Kirby J suggested 
that Courts such as this should recall the prayer of Ajax: “Save us from this fog and 
give us a clear sky, so that we can use our eyes”47  Kirby J suggested and applied the 
following methodology in the case at hand. He stated “that liability should therefore 
be imposed where it was judged that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position 
could have avoided damage by exercising reasonable care and was in such a 
relationship that he or she ought to have acted to do so.  Kirby J concluded that 
“despite its overt circularity, this formulation might at least offer a return to the 
substance of Lord Atkin’s speech in Donoghue v Stevenson.  It might afford a broad 
formulae that poses a factual (or jury) question and avoids the chaos into which other 
attempted formulae have lately led the law.”48  Kirby J then referred to the judgment 
of Priestley JA in Avenhouse v Hornsby Shire Council:  
                                                 
45 Ibid at 197 
46 Ibid at 223 
47 Ibid  
48 Ibid at 229  
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“Courts … decide in case after case, whether or not a duty of care exists in 
new situations. Consideration of all the cases of authority to date leads me to 
the view that the position in Australia … has returned to (or recognized the 
continuing applicability of) what it was immediately after the decision in 
Donoghue v Stevenson: that is, that the courts make decisions by first asking 
the question ‘is the relationship between plaintiff and defendant in the instant 
case so close that a duty arose?’ and then answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in light of 
the court’s own experience-based judgment.”49 
 
Kirby J concluded that the “difficulty with this formulation is that the reference to the 
relationship of the parties as one ‘so close that a duty arose’ could quite easily slip 
back in to the discredited notion that ‘proximity’, alone, is a sufficient criterion for the 
assignment of a legal duty. However, so long as the ‘closeness’ of the relationship 
contemplated is not confined to physical closeness, he could see no great difficulty 
now (and some advantage) in leaving the features of the relationship of 
‘neighbourhood’ undefined and simply asking whether, in all the circumstances, it is 
such as to make it ‘reasonable to impose upon the one a duty of care to the other’. 
This is always the ultimate question that must be answered in all cases of a disputed 
duty of care in negligence.”50  
 
McHugh J in addressing the issue of liability of public authorities and in what 
circumstances they would owe a duty of care stated:  
 
“This Court no longer sees proximity as the criterion of a duty of care. But no 
duty of care can arise unless the relationship of the parties is one of 
neighbourhood in Lord Atkin’s sense as stated in Donoghue v Stevenson. To 
create a duty the relationship between the public authority and persons 
affected by the conduct of the authority must be ‘so closely and directly 
affected by its act or omission that it ought reasonably to have them in 
contemplation as being so affected’ when it directs its mind to the relevant 
conduct in question. In considering whether it should exercise its powers over 
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pollution the Council was no more concerned with oyster consumers than any 
other section of the public or individual. There was no close and direct 
relationship between oyster consumers and the Council such that it had a duty 
to take care for the safety of each and every one of them. In that respect, the 
Council stood in a different position from that of the Barclay Companies who 
had a direct relationship with the consumers of their product. Here, there was 
nothing to suggest that the relationship between the Council and the 
consumers of Wallis Lake oysters imposed on the Council an affirmative duty 
to take reasonable care to protect those consumers from harm caused by eating 
those oysters.”51 
 
Likewise, the joint judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ utilized Lord Atkin’s 
‘neighbour’ principle on the duty of care issue with respect to the local authority. 
They concluded: 
 
“the conduct of the Council did not ‘so closely and directly affect’ oyster 
consumers so as to warrant the imposition of a duty of care owed by the 
former to the latter. There were too many levels of decision-making between 
the conduct of the Council and the harm suffered by the consumers.”52 
 
 
The facts of Gifford 
 
 
The case involved claims for damages for negligently inflicted psychiatric injury 
brought by the children of a man who was killed in an accident at work.  The issue 
before the court was whether the man’s employer owed a duty of care to the children. 
The defendant, a stevedoring company, employed the late Mr Barry Gifford, who was 
crushed to death by a forklift vehicle.  Negligence on the part of the driver of the 
vehicle, who was also an employee of the defendant, and on the part of the defendant 
itself, was alleged, and was admitted. At the time, the plaintiff children were aged 19, 
17 and 14 respectively.  They did not witness the accident. They were all informed of 
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what had occurred later on the same day.  The plaintiffs claim to have suffered 
psychiatric injury in consequence of learning of what had happened to their father.53 
 
The Duty of Care Issue in Gifford 
 
Consistently with Annetts and Barclay Oysters there is express use by all Justices in 
Gifford of Lord Atkin’s “neighbourhood” principle as the foundation for duty. 
McHugh J posited the question on duty as follows: 
“The question then is, whether the relevant principles of the law of negligence 
required a finding that the respondent owed the children a duty of care to 
prevent psychiatric injury. That depends on whether the children were 
‘neighbours’ in Lord Atkin's sense of that term. Were they so closely and 
directly affected by Strang's relationship with their father that Strang ought 
reasonably to have had them in contemplation when it directed its mind to the 
risk of injury to which it was exposing their father?”54  
 
McHugh J continued: 
 
            “A person is a neighbour in Lord Atkin's sense if he or she is one of those 
persons who "are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought 
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected. If the 
defendant ought reasonably foresee that its conduct may affect persons who 
have a relationship with the primary victim, a duty will arise in respect of 
those persons. The test is, would a reasonable person in the defendant's 
position, who knew or ought to know of that particular relationship, consider 
that the third party was so closely and directly affected by the conduct that it 
was reasonable to have that person in contemplation as being affected by that 
conduct?”55 
 
McHugh J concluded that in the present case the relationship between the children 
and their father made them a neighbour of Strang for duty purposes.56 
 
Gummow and Kirby JJ in a joint judgment in Gifford stated: 
           
“The respective positions of the child of an employee and his or her employer 
may readily be seen to attract the ‘neighbourhood’ principle encapsulated by 
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Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson. From the point of view of the employer, 
children of an employee are "persons who are so closely and directly affected 
by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so 
affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are 
called in question.”57 
 
 
Callinan J in reference to the earlier case of [Annetts] stated in Gifford: 
 
 
            “In [Annetts] I attempted to state some bright line rules distilled from the cases 
and elsewhere for the prosecution of what, for convenience and other reasons, 
I there called, and I would continue to call claims for damages for nervous 
shock ….. In doing so I sought to identify and define the classes of persons in 
cases of nervous shock capable of being so closely and directly affected by a 
tortfeasor's negligence that the tortfeasor ought reasonably to have had them in 
contemplation in acting or omitting to act in the way in which he or she did, 
within the classic formulation of Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson.”58 
 
 
The Chief Justice considered that the central issue was whether  it was reasonable to 
 
 require the respondent to have in contemplation the risk of psychiatric injury to the 
 
 appellants, and to take reasonable care to guard against such injury.59 
 
 
Hayne J concluded that the employer owed a duty of care to those family members 
because not only was it foreseeable that they may suffer psychiatric injury on learning 
of the employee's accidental death or serious injury at work, but the relationships 
between employer and employee and between employee and children were so close as 
to require the conclusion that the duty was owed.60 
 
 Universality of the “Neighbour” Principle 
 
One reason that might be advanced for a return to Lord Atkin’s ‘neighbour’ principle 
is that “the lawyer’s mind is ultimately driven to search for a unifying concept.”61  
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The search is for some over-arching principle that underpins the duty issue in all the 
cases. Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson attempted to crystallize the “element 
common to the cases”62 wherein a duty was found to exist. He considered that “there 
must be some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care which the 
cases found in the books are but instances”.63  As Kirby J has noted, conceptualists… 
seek to draw out of existing categories the unifying threads which will permit a 
consistent methodology or approach.”64 
 
It is suggested that for some seventy years the general concept of ‘neighbour’ as a 
measure of the closeness and directness of relationship between tortfeasor and victim, 
not confined to physical closeness but encompassing causal and circumstantial 
closeness (as intended by Lord Atkin) has underpinned a finding of duty of care in all 
categories of negligence.  Labels such as voluntary assumption of responsibility, 
specific or general reliance, relationship next to contract, control and dependence, 
special relationship between the parties, are merely factors indicating closeness and 
directness of relationship.  Such factors assist in answering the ultimate question of 
whether the plaintiff was so closely and directly affected or was in such a close and 
direct relationship with the defendant that the defendant ought to have had the 
plaintiff in contemplation as being so affected.  This ultimate “proximity” question 
requires a subjective value judgment, similar to the ‘reasonable foreseeability’ 
requirement.  What to one judge may involve such a close and direct relationship that 
the defendant ought to have had the plaintiff in contemplation, may not seem so to 
another judge.  The weighing of relevant indicia by judges and their ultimate 
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conclusions on the question of neighbourhood may differ.  However, this is not to 
deny the usefulness of such an over-arching question based on an assessment of the 
degree of closeness and directness of relationship.  The answer to such a question 
provided the court in 1932 with a prima facie guide to the novel issue of the tortious 
responsibility of a manufacturer to a consumer.  It likewise some seventy years later is 
providing guidance in diverse cases such as Annetts, Gifford and Barclay Oysters with 
respect to negligently inflicted psychiatric illness and the liability of public 
authorities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
While it may be too soon to conclude that the High Court of Australia has made a 
permanent return to the seventy year old formulation of Lord Atkin in determining the 
duty of care, the suggestion advanced in this article is that fundamentally the 
‘neighbour’ principle has never been abandoned by the Court, but has underpinned 
labels such as voluntary assumption of responsibility, specific and general reliance, 
relationship next to contract, control and dependence, etc.  As Kirby J concluded in 
Barclay Oysters, “perhaps this is the ultimate lesson for legal theory in the attempted 
conceptualization of the law of negligence and the expression of a universal formula 
for the existence, or absence, of a legal duty of care on the part of one person to 
another.  It may send those who pursue it around in never - ending circles that 
ultimately bring the traveller back to the very point at which the journey began.”65 
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